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	XX		ELENA	CAGNOLI	FIECCONI		ARISTOTLE	ON	THE	AFFECTIVE	POWERS	OF	COLOUR	AND	PICTURES	Penultimate	draft,	please	cite	from	published	version		 ABSTRACT				Aristotle’s	works	on	natural	science	show	that	he	was	aware	of	the	affective	powers	of	colour.	At	De	
an.	421a13,	for	example,	he	writes	that	hard-eyed	animals	can	only	discriminate	between	frightening	and	 non-frightening	 colours.	 In	 the	 Nicomachean	 Ethics,	 furthermore,	 colours	 are	 the	 source	 of	pleasures	and	delight.	These	pleasures,	unlike	the	pleasures	of	touch	and	taste,	neither	corrupt	us	nor	make	us	wiser.	Aristotle’s	views	on	the	affective	powers	of	colours	raise	a	question	about	the	limits	he	seems	to	place	on	 the	affective	powers	of	pictures	at	De	an.	427b15-24,	where	he	 implies	 that	pictures	do	not	 affect	 us	 immediately.	 In	 this	paper,	 I	 examine	 the	 contrast	 between	the	 affective	powers	of	colour	and	the	affective	powers	of	pictures.	I	argue	that	colours	can	give	rise	to	pleasure	and	pain	in	themselves	and	generate	emotions	incidentally.	Similarly,	pictures	can	please	us	or	affect	us	in	themselves	and	incidentally.	In	light	of	this	account,	I	suggest	that,	on	a	plausible	reading	of	De	
an.	427b15-24,	the	affective	powers	of	pictures	as	mimetic	objects	are	not	immediate	because	they	require	 an	 intervening	 cause	 in	order	 to	be	 effective.	The	 representations	of	pictures	and	statues	affect	us	either	with	the	mediation	of	deception	or	with	the	mediation	of	interpretation.	
 
1.	Introduction	Between	 1966	 and	 1970,	 Barnett	 Newman	 produced	 four	 abstract	 paintings	 entitled	
Who’s	Afraid	of	Red,	Yellow	and	Blue.	The	paintings	gave	rise	to	strong	emotional	reactions	in	those	who	first	saw	them,	instilling	anger	rather	than	fear	for	the	most	part,	because	they	broke	the	conventions	of	what	could	count	as	‘art’.	Who’s	Afraid	of	Red,	Yellow	and	Blue	III	is	impressive	in	size,	measuring	224	by	544	cm.	It	features	a	strip	of	blue	on	the	left	side	of	the	canvas	and	a	strip	of	yellow	on	its	right	side.	The	rest	of	the	painting	is	uniformly	red.	The	intense	reactions	prompted	by	viewing	this	painting	reached	their	zenith	when	it	was	the	object	of	a	knife	attack	in	1986,	an	event	that	led	to	an	infamously	unsatisfactory	restoration	
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that	for	some	qualified	as	a	second	attack.1	Who’s	Afraid	of	Red,	Yellow	and	Blue	I,	II,	III	and	IV	are	not	figurative,	yet	they	move	those	who	look	at	them,	in	part	because	they	challenge	their	assumptions	and	beliefs	about	colour	and	art.	In	this	paper,	my	focus	is	on	Aristotle’s	views	on	the	affective	powers	of	colours	 in	nature	and	 in	art.	 I	 argue	that	Aristotle	developed	a	sophisticated	account	of	 the	affective	powers	of	colour.	He	obviously	did	not	envisage	the	possibility	of	colour	in	art	moving	and	angering	the	spectators	in	the	way	Newman’s	works	did.	However,	he	discussed	the	way	in	which	colours	in	nature	can	be	affective	in	themselves	and	incidentally.	In	addition,	he	discussed	the	affective	powers	of	colours	in	artefacts	in	a	way	that	suggests	an	interesting	difference	between	the	affective	powers	of	colours	in	themselves	and	as	constitutive	of	a	mimetic	representation.	In	his	ethical	works,	Aristotle	argues	that	we	can	be	pleased	by	colour	perception.	At	De	
an.	421a8-15	he	suggests	that	certain	animals	may	only	discriminate	differences	in	colours	on	the	basis	of	whether	or	not	these	colours	give	rise	to	fear.	In	this	paper,	I	start	from	these	passages	 in	 order	 to	 reconstruct	 the	 relationship	 between	 colours	 and	 affections	 like	pleasure	and	the	emotions.	I	argue	that,	for	Aristotle,	seeing	a	specific	colour	can	please	us	both	 in	 itself	 and	 incidentally,	 i.e.	 because	 the	 vision	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	 pleasant	 memory,	perception	or	thought.	Hence,	we	can	rejoice	in	the	vision	of	a	shade	of	red	in	itself	or	because	it	reminds	us	of	a	beautiful	sunset.	 In	addition,	a	certain	colour	can	give	rise	 to	emotions	incidentally:	a	shade	of	violet	can	be	fear-inducing	because	we	associate	it	with	a	fearsome	stormy	sea.	In	the	second	section,	I	argue	that	this	account	of	the	affective	powers	of	colours	in	nature	raises	 some	questions	 for	Aristotle’s	view	of	 the	affective	powers	of	 colours	 in	visual	 art.	Aristotle	implies	that	pictures	do	not	affect	us	immediately	(De	an.	427a22-24),	which	can	be	taken	to	suggest	that	while	colour	affects	us	in	nature,	it	is	not	affective	as	part	of	a	pictorial	or	sculptural	representation.	This	view	is,	however,	implausible:	if	colours	can	be	affective	in	themselves,	 then	 pictures	 should	 be	 affective	 simply	 because	 of	 their	 colouration.	Furthermore,	 pictures	 seem	 to	 affect	 us	 incidentally.	 These	 theses	 are	 defended	 in	 the	Aristotelian	corpus,	for	example	in	the	discussion	of	the	link	between	pleasure	and	pictures	at	Poet.	1448b5-19.	In	light	of	this	and	other	texts	in	the	Poetics,	I	argue	that,	for	Aristotle,	a																																																									
1	The	incident	is	narrated	wonderfully	by	MARS	(2019).	
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picture	can	move	us	 incidentally	because	 it	reminds	us	of	something	or	someone	that	we	miss.	A	picture	can	also	affect	us	in	itself,	for	example	because	of	its	colouration.		In	the	third	section,	I	argue	that	Aristotle’s	thesis	that	pictures	do	not	affect	us	immediately	may	 still	 be	 coherent	 with	 the	 account	 I	 reconstruct.	 His	 view	 might	 be	 that	 the	representational	 content	 of	 a	 picture	 moves	 us	 through	 the	 mediation	 of	 deception,	 the	mediation	 of	 interpretation,	 or	 the	 mediation	 of	 association.	 On	 this	 view,	 we	 are	 not	immediately	affected	by	a	scary	depiction	of	a	centaur	because,	in	order	to	be	fearful	of	it,	we	need	to	be	deceived	by	it,	to	look	at	it	in	light	of	its	cultural	context,	or	to	associate	it	with	something	we	find	scary.	My	study	of	the	affective	powers	of	colours	can	help	us	to	interpret	the	affective	powers	of	pictures	in	De	anima.	Aristotle’s	view	on	these	matters	is	not	fully	spelled	out,	but	it	can	be	made	coherent	in	a	way	that	suggests	different	nuances	in	the	link	between	colour	vision,	the	visual	arts,	and	the	emotions.	On	my	interpretation,	Aristotle	does	not	question	the	affective	power	of	representational	content	of	pictures,	but	he	takes	it	to	be	mediated	by	the	observer’s	psychological	condition.		If	this	is	correct,	for	Aristotle	there	is	a	difference	between	the	affective	powers	of	colours	in	 nature	 and	 art	 compared	 to	 the	 affective	 powers	 of	 pictures	 as	 mimetic	 objects.	 This	difference	is	a	matter	of	immediacy	understood	as	the	absence	of	intervening	causes.	Colours	can	 affect	 us	 immediately,	 both	 in	 nature	 and	 as	 part	 of	 artistic	 representations.	 Thus,	pictures	affect	us	immediately	because	of	their	colouring	or	execution.	As	mimetic	objects,	however,	 pictures	 affect	 us	 through	 the	 mediation	 of	 interpretation,	 deception,	 or	association.	At	first	sight,	the	immediate	affective	powers	of	colours	may	seem	surprising	as	a	 counterpart	 to	 the	mediated	 affective	 powers	 of	mimetic	 pictorial	 representations.	We	normally	assume	 that	emotions	 require	a	sophisticated	 intentional	 content	which	 is	most	effectively	and	immediately	conveyed	by	representational	or	mimetic	art:	we	pity	Oedipus	because	 a	 play	 represents	 his	 cursed	 fate.	 However,	 as	 the	 case	 of	 music	 shows,	representations	 are	 not	 necessary	 to	 transmit	 pleasure,	 pain	 or	 other	 affections.	 Music,	especially	if	it	is	not	accompanied	by	words,	can	inspire	fear	without	representing	something	as	 fearsome.	 Hence,	 by	 bringing	 together	 Aristotle’s	 remarks	 on	 the	 affective	 powers	 of	colours,	visual	art,	and	music,	we	can	reconstruct	a	more	nuanced	view.	On	this	view,	the	case	of	simple	colours	and	coloured	pictures	is	parallel	to	the	case	of	simple	sounds	and	complex	
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melodies.	Simple	sounds	and	simple	colours	can	give	rise	to	pleasure	and	pain,	while	complex	melodies	and	complex	coloured	pictures	can	affect	us	independently	of	any	representational	content.	When	they	do	so,	they	affect	us	without	mediation.	However,	pictures	affect	us	by	virtue	of	their	representational	content	only	through	the	mediation	of	deception,	association,	or	interpretation.	In	this	respect,	pictures	differ	from	other	mimetic	arts	like	poetry.		
2.	Affective	Colours	At	Eth.	Nic.	1118a1-b7,	Aristotle	discusses	the	scope	of	 temperance,	a	virtuous	state	 in	relation	to	bodily	pleasure	and	pain.	He	argues	that	temperance	is	strictly	speaking	about	the	pleasures	of	touch	and	taste	and	not	about	the	pleasures	of	sight	and	hearing:	“For	those	who	find	enjoyment	in	objects	of	sight,	such	as	colours,	shapes,	a	picture,	are	called	neither	 temperate	 nor	 intemperate,	 even	 though	 it	would	 also	 seem	 possible	 to	 enjoy	 these	either	rightly	or	excessively	and	deficiently.	The	same	is	true	for	hearing;	no	one	is	ever	called	intemperate	 for	 excessive	 enjoyment	 of	 songs	 or	 playacting,	 or	 temperate	 for	 the	 right	enjoyment	of	them.”2	
 One	can	enjoy	colours,	shapes	and	pictures	more	than	one	should.3	However,	for	Aristotle	this	is	not	intemperance,	but	some	other	vice,	perhaps	a	kind	of	obsession	with	visual	art.	The	same	holds	for	the	pleasures	of	hearing.	Someone	who	enjoys	songs	and	plays	excessively	is	not	an	intemperate	person.	From	this	passage,	we	can	infer	that	colours	can	please	us.	The	vision	of	a	colour	can	either	please	 us	 (or	 pain	 us)	 in	 itself	 or	 please	 us	 incidentally,	 because	 we	 associate	 it	 with	something	else.	This	distinction	emerges	very	clearly	in	the	following	lines,	where	Aristotle	explains	 that	human	and	non-human	animals	enjoy	 the	perception	of	 colours,	 smells	 and	sounds	incidentally	when	it	reminds	them	of	the	prospects	of	food	or	sexual	pleasure.	The	lion	does	not	delight	in	the	sight	of	wildlife,	but	in	the	prospect	of	eating	(Eth.	Nic.	1118a18-23).	In	a	closely	related	passage	from	the	Eudemian	Ethics,	these	incidental	pleasures	arise	not	only	because	of	envisaged	prospects,	but	also	in	virtue	of	one’s	hopes	and	memories	(Eth.																																																									
2	οἱ	γὰρ	χαίροντες	τοῖς	διὰ	τῆς	ὄψεως,	οἷον	χρώμασι	καὶ	σχήμασι	καὶ	γραφῇ,	οὔτε	σώφρονες	οὔτε	ἀκόλαστοι	λέγονται·	καίτοι	δόξειεν	ἂν	εἶναι	καὶ	ὡς	δεῖ	χαίρειν	καὶ	τούτοις,	καὶ	καθ’	ὑπερβολὴν	καὶ	ἔλλειψιν.	ὁμοίως	δὲ	καὶ	ἐν	τοῖς	περὶ	τὴν	ἀκοήν·	τοὺς	γὰρ	ὑπερβεβλημένως	χαίροντας	μέλεσιν	ἢ	ὑποκρίσει	οὐθεὶς	ἀκολάστους	λέγει,	οὐδὲ	τοὺς	ὡς	δεῖ	σώφρονας.	Eth.	Nic.	1118a3-9.	Translations	of	the	Eth.	Nic.	are	from	IRWIN	(1999).	3	Plato’s	lovers	of	sounds	and	sights	at	come	to	mind.	
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Eud.	1231a5-10).	While	both	human	and	non-human	animals	take	pleasure	in	vision,	hearing,	and	smelling	incidentally,	in	these	passages	Aristotle	explains	that	only	humans	can	enjoy	beautiful	colours,	melodious	sounds,	and	the	fragrant	smell	of	flowers	in	themselves.	In	De	
sensu,	 he	 even	 provides	 a	 scientific	 explanation	 of	 the	 link	 between	 specific	 colours	 and	pleasures.	In	the	context	of	a	discussion	of	the	‘juxtaposition	theory’	of	colour,	according	to	which	hues	result	from	white	and	black	juxtaposed	in	different	proportions,	he	argues	that	we	 find	 pleasant	 colours	 that	 are	 juxtaposed	 in	 a	well-proportioned	 ratio	 (Sens.	 439b31-440a6).	Later	on,	he	rejects	 the	 juxtaposition	theory	 in	 favour	of	a	mixture	theory,	but	he	seems	to	consider	this	theory	suitable	to	explain	the	proportions	of	pleasant	colours	on	the	same	lines	(Sens.	440b18-23).4	These	 passages	 invite	 further	 investigation	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 colour	discrimination	and	pleasure.	From	Eth.	Nic.	1175a29-36,	we	know	that	pleasure	makes	our	cognitive	 states	more	 vivid	 and	salient.	 This	 applies	 to	 high	 level	 cognitive	 activities	 that	involve	thinking	and	learning,	but	it	seems	to	extend	to	lower	level	activities	too.	At	Eth.	Eud.	1237a23-26,	 taking	 pleasure	 in	 something	 leads	 us	 to	 recognise	 it	 more	 easily.	 This	recognition	may	be	either	perceptual	or	intellectual.	Furthermore,	the	fact	that	we	can	take	pleasure	in	colours	either	in	themselves	or	incidentally	suggests	that	colour	vision	is	affective	in	a	broader	sense.	Pleasure	and	pain	are	closely	connected	with	the	emotions	(pathê)	they	follow,	 or	 they	may	 accompany	 emotions	 like	 fear,	 confidence,	 envy,	 and	 so	 on	 (Eth.	Nic.	1105b21-23,	Eth.	Eud.	1220b12-14,	and	Mag.	mor.	1186a34-35).5	A	study	of	the	relationship	between	the	sense	of	sight	and	self-preservation	supports	the	thesis	that	certain	colours	may	catch	our	attention	and	elicit	emotions.	Emotions,	attention,	and	desires	guide	an	animal’s	behaviour	in	a	way	that	promotes	its	self-preservation.	At	Sens.	436b18-22,	animals	who	are	capable	of	locomotion	have	sight,	hearing,	and	olfaction	for	the	sake	of	their	self-preservation.	In	cooperation	with	desires	and	other	affective	states,	these	senses	enable	animals	to	pursue	food	and	to	avoid	danger.	Hence,	specific	colours	may	be	especially	vivid	in	an	animal’s	experience	and	elicit	emotions	in	a	way	that	contributes	to	self-preservation.																																																										
4	On	simple	colours	being	pleasant	and	beautiful	per	se,	see	PL.	Phlb.	51b3.	5	The	sense	in	which	pleasures	and	pains	follow	(hepomai)	the	emotions	requires	further	study.	See	further	DOW	(2011);	LEIGHTON	(1982);	FORTENBAUGH	(1975).	
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The	role	of	colour	perception	in	Aristotle’s	psychology	and	biology	indicates	that	colours	can	give	rise	to	emotions,	even	if	the	affective	powers	of	colours	are	not	discussed	at	length.	In	addition,	Aristotle	mentions	the	link	between	fear	and	certain	colours	at	De	an.	ii	9,	in	the	context	of	a	discussion	of	the	peculiar	difficulties	that	occur	in	the	analysis	of	the	sense	of	smell:	“Matters	concerning	smell	and	the	object	of	smell	are	less	easy	to	determine	than	those	that	have	already	been	discussed:	it	is	not	clear	what	sort	of	thing	smell	is,	not	in	the	way	that	it	is	in	the	cases	of	sound	and	colour.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	we	do	not	have	this	sense	with	precision,	but	are	inferior	to	many	animals.	For	humans	smell	things	poorly	and	do	not	perceive	any	object	of	smell	without	its	being	painful	or	pleasant,	because	the	sensory	organ	is	imprecise.	It	is	also	likely	that	hard-eyed	animals	perceive	colours	in	this	way,	and	that	differences	in	colour	are	not	especially	clear	for	them,	excepting	those	which	do	and	do	not	inspire	fear.	So	too	is	the	human	race	when	it	comes	to	smells.”6	
 Analysing	the	sense	of	smell	is	difficult	because,	in	humans,	it	is	inferior	and	less	precise	than	in	other	animals.	As	such,	our	poor	sense	of	smell	often	leads	to	an	inability	to	smell	things,	save	those	with	a	connection	to	pleasure	or	pain.	Our	condition	in	relation	to	smell	is	similar	to	 the	 condition	 of	 hard-eyed	 animals	 in	 relation	 to	 vision,	 which	 only	 allows	 them	discriminate	differences	in	colour	on	the	basis	of	whether	they	inspire	fear	or	not.	The	 animals	 Aristotle	 calls	 “hard-eyed”	may	 be	 insects,	 crustaceans	 or	 lizards.7	 These	animals	have	imprecise	vision,	as	their	capacity	for	colour	discrimination	relies	on	the	link	between	certain	colours	and	fear.	In	noting	this	link,	Aristotle	may	mean	one	of	two	things:	either	 hard-eyed	 animals	 only	 categorise	 colours	 in	 two	 groups,	 the	 fearful	 and	 the	 not-fearful,	or	they	only	recognise	differences	in	hue	when	these	inspire	fear	or	confidence.	On	the	 first	 interpretation,	 hard-eyed	 animals	 do	not	 have	 a	way	 to	 categorise	 and	 perceive	green	and	red,	say,	as	green	and	red.	On	the	second,	they	can	perceive	green	and	red	as	green	
																																																								
6	περὶ	δὲ	ὀσμῆς	καὶ	ὀσφραντοῦ	ἧττον	εὐδιόριστόν	ἐστι	τῶν	εἰρημένων·	οὐ	γὰρ	δῆλον	ποῖόν	τί	ἐστιν	ἡ	ὀσμή,	οὕτως	ὡς	ὁ	ψόφος	ἢ	τὸ	χρῶμα.	αἴτιον	δ’	ὅτι	τὴν	αἴσθησιν	ταύτην	οὐκ	ἔχομεν	ἀκριβῆ,	ἀλλὰ	χείρω	πολλῶν	ζῴων·	φαύλως	γὰρ	ἄνθρωπος	ὀσμᾶται,	καὶ	οὐθενὸς	αἰσθάνεται	τῶν	ὀσφραντῶν	ἄνευ	τοῦ	λυπηροῦ	ἢ	τοῦ	ἡδέος,	ὡς	οὐκ	ὄντος	ἀκριβοῦς	τοῦ	αἰσθητηρίου.	εὔλογον	δ’	οὕτω	καὶ	τὰ	σκληρόφθαλμα	τῶν	χρωμάτων	αἰσθάνεσθαι,	καὶ	μὴ	διαδήλους	αὐτοῖς	εἶναι	τὰς	διαφορὰς	τῶν	χρωμάτων	πλὴν	τῷ	φοβερῷ	καὶ	ἀφόβῳ·	οὕτω	δὲ	καὶ	περὶ	τὰς	ὀσμὰς	τὸ	τῶν	ἀνθρώπων	γένος.	De	an.	421a8-16	Trans.	of	De	an.	based	on	SHIELDS	(2016).	7	 HICKS	 (1907)	 391	 suggests	 insects	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 Part.	 an.	 657b29-658a10,	 ROSS	 (1961)	 254	 includes	crustaceans	and	lizards	on	the	basis	of	Hist.	an.	525b15-526a11;	Hist.	an.	537b12;	Part.	an.	683a27;	Part.	an.	691a24.	
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and	red,	but	they	only	do	so	when	these	hues	are	associated	with	something	that	they	find	fearful,	like	a	predator.8	Independently	 of	 which	 interpretation	 we	 find	 most	 persuasive,	 Aristotle’s	 views	 on	colour	and	pleasure	imply	that	hard-eyed	animals	find	certain	colours	fearsome	incidentally,	i.e.	because	they	associate	them	with	predators	or	other	sources	of	danger.	In	addition,	these	remarks	 on	 colour	 perception	 and	 fear	 in	 hard-eyed	 animals	 allow	 us	 to	 suppose	 that	humans,	too,	can	be	affected	by	colours	beyond	their	capacity	to	take	pleasure	in	them.	We	can	discriminate	and	categorise	different	colour	hues	and	associate	them	with	fearful	things,	thus	 fearing	 the	 colour	 incidentally.	 Although	 Aristotle	 does	 not	 discuss	 pursuit	 and	avoidance	in	relation	to	colour	vision,	he	does	discuss	it	in	relation	to	the	visual	perception	of	movement.	At	De	an.	431b5-10,	seeing	the	movement	of	a	beacon,	we	come	to	recognise	an	enemy	approaching	and,	presumably,	we	feel	fear	or	anger.	This	association	may	lead	us	to	develop	a	fear	of	certain	beacons.	Similarly,	we	might	develop	a	fear	of	violet	because	it	reminds	us	of	a	stormy	sea.9	Unlike	the	beacon-phobia,	a	violet-phobia	of	this	sort	would	be	irrational,	as	violet	is	often	associated	with	perfectly	safe	foods	like	plums	or	pleasant	objects	like	flowers.	There	is	no	evidence	in	the	corpus	that	beings	like	us	could	also	develop	intrinsic	fears	of	certain	 colours,	 without	 the	 need	 to	 associate	 them	 with	 other	 fearful	 things.	 However,	Aristotle	argues	that	we	can	be	affected	by	colours	in	themselves,	at	least	in	so	far	as	we	can	find	them	pleasurable	(Eth.	Nic.	1118a1-5).	Other	passages	suggest	 that	we	might	be	also	capable	 of	 finding	 colours	 painful	 in	 themselves.	 At	 De	 an.	 429b1-3,	 intense	 objects	 of	perception	 (sphodra	 aisthêta),	 like	 strong	 (ischyra)	 colours	 and	 smells,	 prevent	 us	 from	seeing	 and	 smelling.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 strength	 of	 a	 colour	 presumably	 refers	 to	 its																																																									
8	Contra	FREELAND	(1992)	238	n.	10	and	JOHANSEN	(1996)	4	n.	5,	who	assume	that	the	remark	must	be	taken	to	mean	 that	 hard-eyed	 animals	 can	 only	 categorise	 colours	 as	 fear-inducing	 or	 non-fear	 inducing.	 See	 also	Philoponus’	commentary	in	De	an.	15,	387,	1-35.	This	passage	seems	compatible	with	the	view	that	hard-eyed	animals	 can	 categorise	 different	 colours,	 but	 only	when	 they	 concentrate	 on	 them	because	 of	 fear.	On	 the	precision	 of	 the	 senses,	 see	 further	 Gen.	 an.	 781b1-29,	 where	 Aristotle	 suggests	 that	 discrimination	 of	perceptual	differences	may	depend	on	whether	certain	movements	reach	our	central	perceptual	organ,	i.e.	the	heart.	Perhaps,	his	view	is	that	in	hard-eyed	animals,	due	to	the	nature	of	their	eyes,	the	perceptual	movements	relating	to	differences	in	colours	reach	the	central	organ	only	in	association	with	affections	like	fear	or	pleasure.	I	discuss	the	relationship	between	movements	in	the	sensory	organs,	pleasure,	perception	and	attention	further	in	CAGNOLI	FIECCONI	(forthcoming).	9	This	thesis	might	find	support	in	the	view	that	Greek	colour	terminology	is	tied	to	primary	experiences,	e.g.	fecund	oozing	green	vitality,	see	CLARKE	(2004)	or	objects,	e.g.	plant	coloured,	see	BRADLEY	(2013).	
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brilliance,	as	suggested	by	Gen.	an.	780a9-11,	where	an	example	of	a	strong	blinding	colour	is	the	colour	of	the	sun.	Similarly,	at	De	an.	426b2-7	sight	is	destroyed	by	excessively	brilliant	(lampra)	 and	dark	 colours	 (see	also	Pr.	 959a37-b4).	Brilliant	 colours	are	destructive	and	looking	at	them	is	painful.	Hence,	these	colours	may	be	the	ones	that	pain	us	in	themselves	and	 not	 incidentally.	 According	 to	 the	mixture	 theory	 of	 colour	 in	 Sens.	 439b15-440b25,	different	hues	(like	purple,	crimson	and	so	on)	are	all	the	result	of	two	basic	colours	(white	and	black)	mixed	in	different	ratios.	On	the	most	plausible	reconstruction	of	this	view,	white	has	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 brightest	 colour	and	 black	 as	 the	 darkest.	 Aristotle’s	 theory,	therefore,	might	be	based	on	the	observation	that	an	increase	or	reduction	in	the	proportion	level	of	brilliance	generates	a	change	 in	hue:	 the	sun	 is	white,	but	 it	appears	red	when	its	brilliance	 decreases	 because	 it	 is	 seen	 through	 the	 clouds	 (Sens.	 440a10-11).	 If	 different	levels	of	brilliance	correspond	to	changes	in	hue,	it	makes	sense	to	think	of	certain	hues	as	painful	because	they	are,	by	nature,	blinding	and	painful	to	behold.10	If	this	reconstruction	is	right,	for	Aristotle,	human	colour	perception	can	be	affective	in	itself	or	incidentally.	In	the	first	case,	colours	can	be	the	source	of	pleasure	and	pain	by	virtue	of	their	balanced	or	excessive	brilliance.	In	the	second	case,	colours	can	be	affective	because	they	are	associated	with	things	that	we	(or	the	other	animals)	find	scary	or	attractive,	like	the	stormy	sea,	a	predator,	or	a	sunset.11		
																																																								
10	 Aristotle’s	 mixture	 theory	 and	 its	 Empedoclean	 and	 Democritean	 ancestors	 are	 discussed	 in	 detail	 by	KALDERON	(2015)	ch.	4,	5	and	6;	IERODIAKONOU	(2018);	(2005);	SORABJI	(1972).	There	are,	of	course,	problems	with	 regarding	 hues	 as	 a	 result	 of	 different	 combinations	 of	 light	 and	 dark,	 especially	 if	 one	 is	 used	 to	 a	multidimensional	ordering	of	 colours	 in	accordance	with	 their	brightness,	saturation,	and	hue.	See	OSBORNE	(1968);	PLATNAUER	(1921).	Aristotle’s	unidimensional	ordering	strikes	us	as	incorrect	because	it	is	limited,	but	it	is	not,	of	course,	an	indication	of	some	suspicious	ethnolinguistic	thesis	about	the	alleged	“colour	blindness”	or	insensitivity	to	hues	of	the	ancients.	See	BRUNO	(1960)	47-51	and	POLLITT	(2007)	against	the	ethnolinguistic	thesis	defended	most	famously	in	GLADSTONE	(1858)	488	and	to	some	extent	in	PLATNAUER	(1921).	See	KALDERON	(2015)	133-136	on	how	Aristotle’s	mixture	theory	is	not	a	result	of	his	insensitivity	to	hues	and	can	even	be	seen	as	an	ancestor	of	modern	reflectance	theories.	A	study	of	Greek	colour	terminology	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper,	for	an	excellent	reconstruction	and	literature	review	see	BRADLEY	(2009)	12-30;	SASSI	(2003);	(2009).	11	Aristotle’s	analysis	of	the	affective	powers	of	colour	brings	together	the	two	main	strands	of	interpreters	of	Greek	(and	Roman)	colour	terminology	and	colour	perception,	see	SASSI	(2015).	According	to,	inter	alia,	BRADLEY	(2009)	and	CLARKE	 (2004),	 colour	 terminology	and	colour	perception	are	 to	be	explained	by	virtue	of	 their	relationship	with	either	specific	objects	or	cognitive	domains.	According	to	OSBORNE	(1968);	PLATNAUER	(1921)	and	IRWIN	(1974),	colour	terminology	and	colour	perception	are	explained	as	expressing	different	degrees	of	light	and	darkness.	
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3.	Affective	Pictures	In	the	previous	section,	I	argued	that	colours	are	affective:	they	give	rise	to	pleasure,	pain	and	other	affections	in	themselves	and	incidentally.	If	the	most	primitive	object	of	vision	can	be	affective	in	this	way	in	nature,	it	seems	plausible	for	Aristotle	to	assume	that	they	affect	us	 as	 part	 of	objects	 of	 vision	 in	 artefacts	 like	 pictures	 and	 sculptures.	 In	De	 anima	 iii	 3,	however,	 he	 suggests	 that	 pictures	 or	 drawings	 scarcely	 move	 us.	 This	 idea	 plays	 an	important	role	in	his	account	of	the	difference	between	the	affective	powers	of	belief	and	the	affective	powers	of	phantasia.	For	 Aristotle,	 phantasiai	 and	 phantasmata	 are	 perceptual	 remnants	 or	 traces	 of	 past	perceptions	that	we	store	 in	our	souls.	These	traces	are	at	 the	basis	of	 the	explanation	of	phenomena	like	dreams,	perceptual	illusions,	and	memory.	Here,	I	choose	to	leave	the	terms	untranslated.	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 discussion,	 it	 is	 for	 the	most	 part	 suitable	 to	 take	
phantasia	to	correspond	to	imagination	and	phantasmata	and	phantasiai	to	correspond	to	appearances.12	The	point	at	the	centre	of	this	analysis	is	Aristotle’s	view	that	phantasia	and	pictures	have	similar	affective	powers:	“It	is	clear	that	mere	thought	and	supposition	are	not	the	same.	The	former	affection	[sc.	thought	or	phantasia]	is	up	to	us	whenever	we	want	(it	involves	putting	something	before	our	eyes,	as	those	who	consider	their	memories	and	construct	images),	believing	however	is	not	up	to	us:	for	it	is	necessary	either	to	say	the	truth	or	to	speak	falsely.	Furthermore	whenever	we	believe	that	something	 is	 terrible	 or	 frightful,	 we	 are	 immediately	 affected,	 and	 the	 same	 happens	with	something	 audacious.	With	 respect	 to	 phantasia	 we	 are	 like	 someone	 looking	 at	 terrible	 or	audacious	things	in	a	picture.”13	
 
																																																								
12	Insomn.	458b25	ff.;	De	an.	429a1-2;	De	an.	429a4-5.	In	this	paper	I	do	not	attempt	to	provide	a	comprehensive	account	of	Aristotle’s	notion	of	phantasia.	On	the	unity	or	disunity	of	his	account,	see	especially:	CASTON	(1996);	SCHOFIELD	(1992);	and	FREDE	(1992).	On	the	role	of	phantasia	in	Aristotle’s	ethics	see	MOSS	(2012).	13	 ὅτι	 δ’	 οὐκ	 ἔστιν	 ἡ	 αὐτὴ	 [νόησις]	 καὶ	 ὑπόληψις,	 φανερόν.	 τοῦτο	 μὲν	 γὰρ	 τὸ	 πάθος	 ἐφ’	 ἡμῖν	 ἐστιν,	 ὅταν	βουλώμεθα	 (πρὸ	 ὀμμάτων	 γὰρ	 ἔστι	 τι	 ποιήσασθαι,	 ὥσπερ	 οἱ	 ἐν	 τοῖς	 μνημονικοῖς	 τιθέμενοι	 καὶ	εἰδωλοποιοῦντες),	δοξάζειν	δ’	οὐκ	ἐφ’	ἡμῖν·	ἀνάγκη	γὰρ	ἢ	ψεύδεσθαι	ἢ	ἀληθεύειν.	ἔτι	δὲ	ὅταν	μὲν	δοξάσωμεν	δεινόν	τι	ἢ	φοβερόν,	εὐθὺς	συμπάσχομεν,	ὁμοίως	δὲ	κἂν	θαρραλέον·	κατὰ	δὲ	τὴν	φαντασίαν	ὡσαύτως	ἔχομεν	ὥσπερ	ἂν	εἰ	θεώμενοι	ἐν	γραφῇ	τὰ	δεινὰ	ἢ	θαρραλέα,	De	an.	427b15-24.	In	15,	I	retain	νόησις	and	I	follow	the	majority	of	manuscripts	which	have	ἡ	αὐτὴ	as	opposed	to	αὕτη,	see	however	BARBOTIN	/	JANNONE	(1966).	I	follow	Polansky,	 Freudenthal	 and	 Hamlyn,	 inter	 alia,	 in	 taking	 noêsis	 in	 the	 first	 line	 to	 stand	 for	 phantasia	 (see	POLANSKY	[2007]	410;	HAMLYN	[1968]	132;	FREUDENTHAL	[2010]),	cf.	SIMPL.	In	De	an.	206,	5	and	PHLP.	In	De	an.	492,	24.	For	a	similar	use	see	De	an.	433a9-10.	SHIELDS	(2016)	77,	n.	44	obtains	the	same	result	by	either	reading	
phantasia	instead	of	noêsis	or	by	secluding	noêsis.	Since	in	this	passage	Aristotle	is	contrasting	belief	(doxa	or	
hypolêpsis)	and	phantasia,	it	is	clear	that	to	pathos	in	the	second	line	is	phantasia.	
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Believing	and	imagining	are	different,	the	former	is	not	up	to	us	whenever	we	want,	the	latter	is	up	to	us.	In	addition,	believing	that	something	is	terrible,	frightful,	or	audacious	affects	us	immediately.	If,	instead	of	a	belief,	we	have	a	phantasia	of	something	frightful,	we	react	in	a	different	 way,	 which	 Aristotle	 thinks	 is	 similar	 to	 how	 people	 react	 when	 they	 look	 at	audacious	or	terrible	things	in	a	picture.	In	attempting	to	elucidate	the	contrast	between	belief	and	phantasia	in	this	passage,	some	have	assumed	that,	for	Aristotle,	pictures	do	not	move	us	emotionally.14	This	assumption	can	be	made	more	palatable	by	an	obvious	qualification:	phantasiai	or	pictures	leave	us	unmoved	
unless	we	take	them	to	be	true.15	If,	for	some	reason,	our	reasoning	capacities	are	covered	over	and	we	are	deceived	by	a	picture	or	a	phantasia,	we	will	react	accordingly.	Someone	who	is	 fooled	 by	 a	 well-crafted	 trompe	 l’œil	 of	 a	 growling	 predator	 will	 feel	 fear.	 Similarly,	someone	who	 takes	a	perceptual	 illusion	 to	be	 true	may	 react	 emotionally	 to	 it.	Aristotle	describes	a	case	of	this	sort	in	his	account	of	the	illusions	that	are	characteristic	of	feverish	people	at	 Insomn.	460b9-17:	 in	 the	grip	of	 fever,	cracks	on	the	wall	might	 look	 like	 living	animals	to	the	sick	person.	If	the	fever	is	high,	it	might	escape	her	notice	that	the	animals	are	not	actually	there	and	she	might	move	toward	them	(kineisthai	pros	auta).	Surely,	if	we	move	toward	false	appearances	when	we	are	deceived	by	them,	we	can	also	be	affected	by	them.	Similarly,	we	can	be	affected	by	a	picture	if	we	fail	to	distinguish	it	from	reality.16	Despite	the	added	qualification	that	we	can	be	affected	when	appearances	and	pictures	deceive	 us,	 this	 account	 of	 the	 affective	 powers	 of	phantasia	 and	 the	 affective	 powers	 of	pictures	is	likely	to	still	strike	us	as	unsatisfactory,	even	within	the	context	of	Aristotle’s	own	writing	on	these	topics.	Let	us	begin	with	the	case	of	phantasia.	In	his	psychological	works,	Aristotle	allows	that	merely	contemplating	fearsome	things	can	affect	us,	even	if	we	do	not	take	them	to	be	truly	fearsome.	At	De	an.	432b29-433a1,	just	thinking	of	something	fearsome	can	make	our	heart	leap,	even	if	our	intellect	does	not	urge	us	to	escape	or	to	feel	fear	(De																																																									
14	The	tradition	goes	back	to	Themistius	in	his	commentary	On	Aristotle	On	the	Soul	89,	18.	See	also	HICKS	(1907)	498;	DOW	(2009)	164-165,	n.	69	assumes	that	pictures	do	not	move	us	emotionally	and	notes	how	this	claim	is	in	tension	with	the	Poetics.	15	PEARSON	(2014)	sec.	7,	cf.	MCCREADY-FLORA	(2013),	who	introduces	the	notion	of	restraint	to	account	for	our	responses	 to	 appearances.	 Both	 authors	 note	 that	 this	 qualification	 does	 not	 on	 its	 own	 account	 for	 our	emotional	responses	to	fiction.	16	See	e.g.	and	Pliny’s	famous	account	of	Zeuxis’	painted	grapes,	which	were	so	realistic	that	they	deceived	birds	(NH	35,	36).	
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motu	an.	701b16-22,	De	motu	an.	703b4-8).17	If	endorsement	is	not	necessary	in	these	cases,	it	is	hard	to	see	why	it	should	be	in	the	case	of	phantasia.	Furthermore,	we	find	evidence	that	
phantasia	can	induce	emotions	like	anger	if	it	is	not	rationally	endorsed.18	For	instance,	the	desire	 for	 retaliation	 that	 is	 characteristic	 of	 anger	 can	 be	 the	 result	 of	 dwelling	 on	 the	
phantasma	of	a	pleasant	revenge	at	Rh.	1378b1-10.	It	is	also	plausible	to	think	that	phantasia	gives	 rise	 to	 emotions	 and	 desires	 that	 go	 against	what	we	 take	 to	 be	 the	 case,	 such	 as	recalcitrant	emotions	and	urges	(Eth.	Eud.	1235b25-29,	De	an.	433b5-10).	If	you	are	afraid	of	weasels	despite	your	belief	that	they	are	harmless,	in	Aristotle’s	view,	your	fear	is	likely	to	be	based	on	a	phantasia	of	the	weasel	as	fearful.	This	phantasia	is	affective,	yet	it	is	not	one	you	rationally	endorse.19	On	reflection,	then,	Aristotle	might	not	be	so	convinced	that	phantasia	is	affectively	inert	unless	we	rationally	endorse	its	representations.	Nor	does	he	seem	committed	to	the	view	that	looking	at	pictures	of	terrible	and	audacious	things	leaves	us	unaffected.	He	mentions	cases	 in	which	pictures	give	rise	 to	emotions	at	Poet.	1454b19-1455a21,	where	we	find	a	detailed	summary	of	the	various	ways	in	which	a	character’s	identity	can	be	unveiled	in	a	play:																																																									
17	See	BELFIORE	(1985),	who	takes	these	reactions	to	be	analogous	to	the	ones	we	have	to	fiction	in	general	and	pictures	in	particular.	Below	I	suggest	that,	in	fact,	for	Aristotle,	our	reactions	to	pictures	are	more	complex	than	these	involuntary	physiological	reactions.	18	See	further	MOSS	(2012)	69-94.	19	In	addition	to	MOSS	(2012)	See	also	COOPER	(1998)	417;	STRIKER	(1996)	291;	SIHVOLA	(1996)	59-60.	Unlike	these	 authors,	 I	 do	 not	 take	 the	 cognitive	 basis	 of	 recalcitrant	 emotions	 as	 evidence	 that	 emotions	 are	necessarily	based	on	phantasia.	The	question	of	the	cognitive	basis	of	emotions	has	received	much	attention	in	the	literature.	Here,	my	aim	is	merely	to	show	that	taking	something	to	be	rationally	true	is	not	necessary	to	be	affected	by	 it,	even	outside	 the	context	of	our	engagement	with	 fiction.	Thus,	my	view	is	 incompatible	with	interpretations	 that	 take	 the	evaluative	cognitions	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 all	 human	emotions	 to	 be	endorsed	DOW	(2009);	(2014);	LEIGHTON	(1982);	NUSSBAUM	(1996)	307.	However,	my	view	is	compatible	with	those	who	argue	that	emotions	are	based	on	phantasia,	and	hence	need	not	be	taken	to	be	true	by	cognitively	well-functioning	humans	MOSS	(2012)	75;	COOPER	(1998);	STRIKER	(1996);	NIEUWENBURG	(2002);	PEARSON	(2014)	argues	that	the	cognitive	basis	of	our	emotional	states	is	mixed,	i.e.	it	includes	both	beliefs	and	phantasiai.	Here	I	argue	that	
phantasia	can	affect	us	without	assent	(rational	or	non-rational)	because	it	can	give	rise	to	recalcitrant	emotions	against	what	we	take	to	be	the	case.	I	take	it	that	there	is	no	evidence	in	Aristotle	for	different	kinds	of	assents,	one	rational	and	another	non-rational,	but	I	agree	that	we	might	make	sense	of	his	view	by	introducing	these	notions,	see	e.g.	DOW	(2014).	The	central	point	of	this	paper	still	stands	even	if	one	grants	that	phantasia	 is	affective	only	when	we	assent	to	it,	either	rationally	or	non-rationally.	This	would	still	mean	that	phantasia	affects	 us	 with	 the	 mediation	 of	 assent,	 just	 as	 painting	 affect	 us	 with	 the	 mediation	 of	 deception	 or	 of	interpretation.	The	analogy	would	however	be	less	neat,	because,	while	painting	requires	either	deception	or	interpretation,	phantasia	would	presumably	only	 require	a	kind	of	assent.	The	presence	of	other	mediating	psychological	conditions	would	be	relevant	only	in	so	far	as	they	give	rise	to	a	sort	of	non-rational	assent.	 I	thank	Paolo	Crivelli	for	pushing	me	to	clarify	this	point.	
	 12	
“[Examples	of	this	are	in]	The	Cyprians	of	Dicaeogenes,	the	sight	of	the	picture	makes	the	man	burst	into	tears,	and	in	the	tale	of	Alcinous,	hearing	the	lyre	player	and	reminiscing,	Odysseus	weeps.	Thus,	they	are	recognised.”20	
 In	these	examples,	the	main	characters	give	away	their	disguise	because	they	are	moved	by	what	they	see	or	hear.	For	our	purposes,	it	matters	that,	in	one	case,	the	character	is	so	moved	by	the	sight	of	a	picture	that	he	bursts	into	tears.21	This	suggests	that	Aristotle	was	aware	that	pictures	can	be	affective	incidentally,	when	they	give	rise	to	moving	memories.	In	the	same	way,	music	or	stories	can	be	moving	because	they	remind	us	of	past	events,	as	the	lyre	player	reminds	Odysseus	of	the	fall	of	Troy.	Furthermore,	similar	to	the	case	of	colours,	Aristotle’s	discussion	of	the	pleasures	that	viewers	take	in	pictorial	representations	suggests	that	they	can	be	affective	in	themselves,	even	 if	 they	 do	 not	 remind	 us	of	 something	 else.22	 In	 the	Poetics,	 Aristotle	 draws	 on	 our	engagement	with	pictures	in	order	to	explain	the	sense	in	which	mimêsis	comes	natural	to	beings	like	us:23	“Mimetic	activity	is	natural	to	humans	from	childhood,	and	they	differentiate	themselves	from	the	other	animals	because	they	are	most	mimetic,	they	first	learn	through	mimêsis,	and	they	take	pleasure	in	mimetic	objects.	A	sign	of	this	is	what	happens	in	practice:	for	we	take	pleasure	in	contemplating	the	most	precise	pictures	of	the	very	things	we	find	painful	to	see,	the	forms	for	example	of	the	worst	animals	and	of	corpses.	The	explanation	is	this:	to	learn	something	is	most	pleasant	not	only	for	the	philosophers	but	similarly	for	everyone	else,	even	though	they	have	little	access	to	it;	the	reason	why	they	delight	in	seeing	pictures	is	because	as	they	contemplate	they	learn	and	reason	what	each	thing	is,	e.g.	that	this	one	is	that	one;	since	unless	one	happens	to	 have	 seen	 it	 before,	 it	 will	 not	 generate	 pleasure	 as	 a	 mimetic	 object,	 but	 because	 of	 its	execution,	colouring,	or	some	other	similar	cause.”24	
 																																																								
20	ὥσπερ	ἡ	ἐν	Κυπρίοις	τοῖς	Δικαιογένους,	ἰδὼν	γὰρ	τὴν	γραφὴν	ἔκλαυσεν,	καὶ	ἡ	ἐν	Ἀλκίνου	ἀπολόγῳ,	ἀκούων	γὰρ	τοῦ	κιθαριστοῦ	καὶ	μνησθεὶς	ἐδάκρυσεν,	ὅθεν	ἀνεγνωρίσθησαν.	Poet.	1455a1-4.	Trans.	of	the	Poetics	are	adapted	from	Bywater’s	in	BARNES	(1991).	21	We	do	not	know	much	about	the	Cyprians	beyond	this	reference	to	the	recognition	scene.	22	See	also	HALLIWELL	(1990).	23	I	leave	the	term	and	cognates	untranslated,	as	an	interpretation	of	Aristotle’s	account	of	mimêsis	would	be	impossible	to	tackle	in	this	paper.	See	further	(and	inter	alia)	HALLIWELL	(2002)	and	WOODRUFF	(1992).	24	τό	τε	γὰρ	μιμεῖσθαι	σύμφυτον	τοῖς	ἀνθρώποις	ἐκ	παίδων	ἐστὶ	καὶ	τούτῳ	διαφέρουσι	τῶν	ἄλλων	ζῴων	ὅτι	μιμητικώτατόν	ἐστι	καὶ	τὰς	μαθήσεις	ποιεῖται	διὰ	μιμήσεως	τὰς	πρώτας,	καὶ	τὸ	χαίρειν	τοῖς	μιμήμασι	πάντας.	σημεῖον	δὲ	τούτου	τὸ	συμβαῖνον	ἐπὶ	τῶν	ἔργων·	ἃ	γὰρ	αὐτὰ	λυπηρῶς	ὁρῶμεν,	τούτων	τὰς	εἰκόνας	τὰς	μάλιστα	ἠκριβωμένας	χαίρομεν	θεωροῦντες,	οἷον	θηρίων	τε	μορφὰς	τῶν	ἀτιμοτάτων	καὶ	νεκρῶν.	αἴτιον	δὲ	καὶ	τούτου,	ὅτι	μανθάνειν	οὐ	μόνον	τοῖς	φιλοσόφοις	ἥδιστον	ἀλλὰ	καὶ	τοῖς	ἄλλοις	ὁμοίως,	ἀλλ’	ἐπὶ	βραχὺ	κοινωνοῦσιν	αὐτοῦ.	διὰ	γὰρ	τοῦτο	χαίρουσι	τὰς	εἰκόνας	ὁρῶντες,	ὅτι	συμβαίνει	θεωροῦντας	μανθάνειν	καὶ	συλλογίζεσθαι	τί	ἕκαστον,	οἷον	ὅτι	οὗτος	ἐκεῖνος·	ἐπεὶ	ἐὰν	μὴ	τύχῃ	προεωρακώς,	οὐχ	ᾗ	μίμημα	ποιήσει	τὴν	ἡδονὴν	ἀλλὰ	διὰ	τὴν	ἀπεργασίαν	ἢ	τὴν	χροιὰν	ἢ	διὰ	τοιαύτην	τινὰ	ἄλλην	αἰτίαν.	Poet.	1448b5-19.	
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Human	beings	are	the	most	mimetic	animals,	which	is	proven,	among	other	things,	by	the	fact	that	they	take	pleasure	in	mimêsis.	In	order	to	explain	the	nature	and	workings	of	our	mimetic	pleasures,	 Aristotle	 chooses	 the	 example	 of	 taking	 pleasure	 in	 seeing	 a	 picture	 (eikôn).25	Some	pictures	 give	 us	pleasure	 in	 themselves,	 or	merely	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	 colouring	 and	technical	 execution.	 In	 this	 case,	Aristotle	explains	 that	we	do	not	enjoy	 them	as	mimetic	objects.	Contemplation	of	a	picture	as	a	mimetic	object	gives	rise	to	a	specific	pleasure:	the	pleasure	of	learning	and	reasoning.26	Evidence	for	this	is	also	the	fact	that	we	enjoy	looking	at	 pictures	 of	 things	 that	we	 find	 disgusting	 or	 fearsome,	 like	 corpses	 (see	 also	Part.	 an.	645a8-15	and	Rh.	1371b4-10).	Interpreters	have	struggled	to	unpack	the	nature	of	the	reasoning,	learning,	and	pleasure	that	we	take	in	pictures	as	mimetic	objects.	We	can	get	a	sense	of	the	difficulties	that	this	passage	raises	by	reflecting	on	why	Aristotle	thinks	that	we	can	enjoy	a	picture	as	a	mimetic	object	 only	 if	 we	 have	 seen	 it	 before.	 Depending	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 this	 presupposed	acquaintance,	we	end	up	with	very	different	explanations	of	the	sort	of	pleasure	and	learning	that	pictures	as	mimetic	objects	afford.	Perhaps	Aristotle	simply	means	that	we	need	to	be	familiar	with	the	person	or	the	thing	that	the	picture	represents.	Hence,	we	need	to	have	seen	Coriscus	to	take	pleasure	in	a	portrait	of	Coriscus.	This	suggests	that	the	pleasure	that	we	take	in	pictures	as	mimetic	objects	is	something	like	the	pleasure	of	recognition,	or	perhaps	the	pleasure	of	understanding	that	the	picture	is	a	fine	(or	realistic)	representation.27	From	this	perspective,	we	can	explain	why	the	pleasure	in	question	is	accessible	to	all	humans	and	why	we	can	take	pleasure	in	looking	at	pictures	of	things	we	do	not	find	pleasurable	in	real	life.	Recognising	the	similarities	and	differences	between	a	picture	and	what	it	represents	is	something	 all	 of	 us	 can	 do.	 Furthermore,	 we	 can	 take	 pleasure	 in	 this	 recognition	independently	of	whether	or	not	we	find	the	object	of	the	representation	pleasant.	This	 interpretation,	 however,	 is	 not	well	 suited	 to	 explain	why	Aristotle	 describes	 our	pleasant	 engagement	 with	 pictures	 as	 a	 form	 of	 learning	 (manthanô)	 and	 reasoning	
																																																								
25	In	some	contexts,	eikôn	means	portrait	(e.g.	Mem.	450b21-451a15),	but	I	follow	HALLIWELL	(2002)	183	and	GONZÁLEZ	(2019)	in	taking	eikones	to	stand	for	pictures	in	general	here.	26	The	same	difference	is	at	play	at	Poet.	1450b1-4,	where	we	take	different	pleasures	in	beautiful	colours	laid	over	without	order	in	orderly	black	and	white	pictures.	27	See	respectively	TSITSIRIDIS	(2005);	HEATH	(2009).	
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(syllogizomai).28	Being	able	to	recognise	the	subject	of	a	painting	does	not	seem	to	require	something	 as	 sophisticated	 as	 reasoning.29	 Similarly,	 distinguishing	 a	 painting	 from	 its	subject	 is	 a	 trivial	 cognitive	 exercise.30	 In	addition,	 the	 scope	of	 the	pleasures	we	 take	 in	contemplating	pictures	would	be	very	narrow	if	they	only	stemmed	from	distinguishing	(or	identifying)	 the	representations	with	their	original.	At	Poet.	1448b5-19,	Aristotle	makes	a	general	point	about	mimetic	pleasures.	This	suggests	that	he	had	in	mind	something	that	goes	beyond	portraits	of	specific	people	or	things.	Presumably,	he	also	considered	representations	of	mythical	subjects,	with	which	he	and	his	contemporaries	would	have	been	very	familiar.	If	this	is	so,	 it	 is	unlikely	 that	he	took	the	pleasure	that	one	takes	 in	viewing	a	picture	to	be	dependent	 on	 whether	 they	 had	 seen	 its	 subject	 before,	 because	 no	 one	 has	 genuine	perceptual	encounters	with	a	hero	or	a	giant.	 If	Aristotle	 is	making	a	point	 that	applies	to	pictures	of	this	kind	too,	he	must	mean	that	we	take	pleasure	in	learning	from	a	picture	if	we	connect	it	with	some	pre-existent	knowledge	of	the	myth	it	represents,	including	perhaps	our	previous	acquaintance	with	other	representations	of	 the	myth.	Perhaps,	 this	also	 involves	grasping	 ethical	 universals	 that	 explain	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	myth:	 if	we	 see	 a	 picture	 of	Medea,	we	can	adjudicate	the	emotions	it	expresses	and	the	character	it	represents	on	the	basis	of	our	views	on	the	appropriate	grounds	for	anger	and	the	appropriate	expressions	of	vengeance.	Thus,	we	might	draw	a	close	analogy	between	the	way	in	which	poetry	speaks	of	universals	at	Poet.	1451b5-7	and	the	pleasure	of	learning	from	pictures.31	This	 dense	 passage	 from	 the	 Poetics	 therefore	 suggests	 that	 we	 can	 take	 pleasure	 in	pictures	 in	 two	 ways.	 We	 might	 take	 pleasure	 in	 the	 artistic	 skill	 or	 colouring	 that	characterises	 them,	 perhaps	 because	 of	 the	 brilliance	 of	 their	 colours	 or	 the	 innovative	technique	with	which	they	were	created.	We	might	also	take	pleasure	in	pictures	as	mimetic	objects.	When	we	do	so,	we	take	pleasure	in	learning	from	the	representational	content	of																																																									
28	A	full	sketch	of	this	sort	of	reasoning	requires	a	closer	analysis	of	the	terms	in	question	and	of	the	expression	
houtos	 ekeinos	 at	 Poet.	 1448b17	 and	 analogous	 expressions	 at	 Rh.	 1371b9	 and	 Rh.	 1410b19.	 See	 further	GONZÁLEZ	(2019)	and	HALLIWELL	(2002)	188-193.	Even	if	we	do	not	take	syllogizomai	 to	signify	 ‘to	construct	syllogisms’	in	the	technical	sense,	it	seems	appropriate	to	take	this	activity	to	involve	some	kind	of	reasoning.	29	See	HEATH	(2009)	contra	TSITSIRIDIS	(2005).	30	See	GONZÁLEZ	(2019)	contra	HEATH	(2009).	31	On	this	controversial	link,	see	GONZÁLEZ	(2019);	HALLIWELL	(2002)	ch.	6;	HALLIWELL	(2001).	NUSSBAUM	(1986)	388	 seems	 to	me	 right	 in	 noting	 that	we	 should	 allow	 the	 kind	 of	 reasoning	 and	 learning	 that	 stems	 from	contemplating	 a	 picture	 to	 be	 wide-ranging	 and	 to	 include	 reflection	 on	 moral	 maxims	 as	 well	 as	 basic	recognition.	
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the	 picture.	 If	 the	 representation	 is	 simple,	 the	 learning	 might	 concern	 the	 anatomical	structure	 of	 an	 animal	 that	 we	 never	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 observe	 closely.	 If	 the	representation	is	complex,	the	learning	might	go	as	far	as	instilling	or	recalling	moral	lessons	about	bravery	in	battle	or	about	the	appropriateness	of	anger	and	vengeance.	The	case	of	pictures	is	similar	to	the	case	of	simple	colours	in	some	respects.	Pictures	can	please	and	pain	us	 incidentally	when	 they	 remind	us	of	something	pleasant	or	painful	or	because	we	 learn	 from	 the	 things	 they	 represent.	 They	 can	 also	 please	 us	 or	 pain	 us	 in	themselves,	because	they	display	brilliant	or	terrible	colours	and	techniques.	If	this	is	correct,	we	have	good	reason	to	think	that,	for	Aristotle,	pictures	can	be	affective	beyond	their	ability	to	generate	pleasure.	As	we	have	seen	 in	our	discussion	of	colours,	pleasure	and	pain	are	closely	 related	 to	 the	 emotions	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 generate	 pleasure	 and	 pain	 is	 a	 good	indication	of	a	thing’s	affective	powers.	This	analysis	also	allows	us	to	draw	an	important	distinction	in	the	affective	powers	of	pictures.	 We	 are	 affected	 by	 the	 colouration	 and	 execution	 of	 a	 picture	 and	 also	 by	 its	representational	or	mimetic	content.	When	he	implies	that	the	affective	powers	of	pictures	are	 limited	 at	 De	 an.	 427b15-24,	 Aristotle	 might	 only	 be	 concerned	 with	 their	representational	content.	His	view,	then,	needs	not	be	in	tension	with	the	thesis	that	colours	can	please	us	and	affect	us,	whether	or	not	they	are	part	of	a	pictorial	representation.	Hence,	Aristotle	can	coherently	maintain	that	there	is	no	difference	between	the	affective	powers	of	colours	in	nature	and	colours	as	part	of	an	artistic	representation.	Since	pictures	can	please	us	both	because	of	their	colouration	and	as	mimetic	objects,	however,	this	clarification	leaves	us	with	the	challenge	to	explain	the	affective	powers	of	pictures	as	mimetic	objects.	After	all,	Aristotle	grants	that	pictures	can	affect	us	as	mimetic	objects	at	least	incidentally,	when	they	remind	us	of	something	we	find	moving	(Poet.	1455a1-4).		
4.	The	Affective	Powers	of	Pictures	as	Mimetic	Objects	In	order	to	address	the	affective	powers	of	pictures	as	mimetic	objects,	it	is	helpful	to	look	at	Aristotle’s	most	detailed	account	of	the	way	in	which	pictures	represent	character,	found	in	 the	Politics.	 In	 this	 context,	Aristotle’s	 concern	 is	 to	explain	 the	difference	between	 the	educational	role	of	the	visual	arts—such	as	painting	and	sculptures—versus	music.	He	argues	
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that	both	have	some	potential,	but	music	is	more	powerful	because	it	contains	likenesses	of	character:	“It	so	happens	that	in	the	other	objects	of	perception,	as	in	the	objects	of	touch	and	taste,	there	is	no	likeness	of	characters,	although	in	the	objects	of	vision	there	is	a	little	(figures	are	of	this	kind,	but	only	a	little,	and	not	everyone	shares	in	this	kind	of	perception.	Furthermore,	these	resulting	figures	and	colours	of	characters	are	not	likenesses	of	characters,	but	rather	signs,	and	these	 signs	are	distinguishing	marks	 for	 the	 emotions,	 in	 so	 far	as	 even	 contemplating	 them	makes	a	difference,	the	young	must	not	look	at	the	works	of	Pauson	but	at	those	of	Polygnotus,	and	 of	 any	 other	 ethical	 painter),	 but	 in	 melodies	 themselves	 there	 are	 imitations	 of	characters.”32	
 In	 the	 objects	of	 vision	 there	 are	 not	 likenesses	 of	 characters,	 but	mere	 signs.	Figures	or	shapes	(schêmata)	of	painting	and	statuary	contain	signs	of	character,	and	these	signs	are	the	marks	 of	 emotions.	 Aristotle,	 here,	 is	 emphasising	 the	 limits	 of	 paintings	 and	 sculptures.	Unlike	music,	 these	art	 forms	cannot	contain	 likenesses	of	character,	presumably	because	they	do	not	change	through	time.33	In	the	following	lines,	Aristotle	goes	on	to	argue	that	an	indication	of	the	ability	of	music	to	contain	likenesses	of	character	is	that	it	affects	its	listeners	emotionally	(Pol.	1340a40-b15).	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	paintings	cannot	affect	us	or	represent	character.	After	all,	in	this	very	passage	Aristotle	allows	that	paintings	can	make	a	difference	in	moral	education,	which	is	why	the	young	should	look	at	Polygnotus’	work	and	not	Pauson’s.	As	we	know	from	Poet.	1448a5,	the	difference	between	these	two	artists	is	that	the	former	represented	people	in	a	favourable	light,	making	them	better	than	they	tend	to	be,	while	the	latter	represented	his	subjects	as	worse	than	people	normally	are.	Hence,	the	signs	of	character	 in	a	painting	allow	us	to	recognise	moral	exemplars	and	their	opposites.	Not	many	sources	in	the	Aristotelian	corpus	offer	clarification	on	the	difficult	point	that	figures																																																									
32	συμβέβηκε	δὲ	τῶν	αἰσθητῶν	ἐν	μὲν	τοῖς	ἄλλοις	μηδὲν	ὑπάρχειν	ὁμοίωμα	τοῖς	ἤθεσιν,	οἷον	ἐν	τοῖς	ἁπτοῖς	καὶ	τοῖς	γευστοῖς,	ἀλλ’	ἐν	τοῖς	ὁρατοῖς	ἠρέμα	(σχήματα	γὰρ	ἔστι	τοιαῦτα,	ἀλλ’	ἐπὶ	μικρόν,	καὶ	<οὐ>	πάντες	τῆς	τοιαύτης	 αἰσθήσεως	 κοινωνοῦσιν·	 ἔτι	 δὲ	 οὐκ	 ἔστι	 ταῦτα	 ὁμοιώματα	 τῶν	 ἠθῶν,	 ἀλλὰ	 σημεῖα	 μᾶλλον	 τὰ	γιγνόμενα	σχήματα	καὶ	χρώματα	τῶν	ἠθῶν,	καὶ	ταῦτ’	ἐστὶν	ἐπίσημα	ἐν	τοῖς	πάθεσιν·	οὐ	μὴν	ἀλλ’	ὅσον	διαφέρει	καὶ	περὶ	τὴν	τούτων	θεωρίαν,	δεῖ	μὴ	τὰ	Παύσωνος	θεωρεῖν	τοὺς	νέους,	ἀλλὰ	τὰ	Πολυγνώτου	κἂν	εἴ	τις	ἄλλος	τῶν	γραφέων	ἢ	τῶν	ἀγαλματοποιῶν	ἐστιν	ἠθικός),	ἐν	δὲ	τοῖς	μέλεσιν	αὐτοῖς	ἔστι	μιμήματα	τῶν	ἠθῶν.	Pol.	1340a23-39.	Trans.	of	the	Politics	are	based	on	KRAUT	(1997).	The	text	and	content	of	this	passage	are	difficult	to	interpret.	I	follow	OCT	and	accept	the	conjectural	insertion	of	οὐ	before	πάντες	at	1340a31	contra	JOWETT	(1885).	 Another	 possible	 emendation	 is	 σχήματα	 γὰρ	 ἔστι	 τοιαῦτα,	 καὶ	 πάντες	 τῆς	 τοιαύτης	 αἰσθήσεως	κοινωνοῦσιν,	 ἀλλ’	 ἐπὶ	 μικρόν,	 see	 SUSEMIHL	/	HICKS	 (1895)	 593.	 A	 similar	 reading	 can	 be	 obtained	without	transposing,	see	GONZÁLEZ	(2019)	183	n.	32.	For	my	purposes,	it	does	not	matter	which	reading	one	adopts.	33	I	defend	this	point	at	length	in	CAGNOLI	FIECCONI	(2016),	where	I	argue	that	music	is	not	representational,	but	contains	the	same	order	in	variety	that	character	dispositions	and	actions	display.	
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and	colours	are	signs	of	characters	or	distinguishing	marks	for	the	emotions.34	His	view	might	be	that	a	painting’s	colouring	and	shapes	can	give	us	an	indication	of	the	emotions	felt	by	the	subjects	represented.	These	emotions,	in	turn,	are	a	sign	of	their	character	traits.	In	absence	of	 further	evidence,	one	way	to	understand	this	view	better	 takes	us	 to	 the	work	of	other	authors	who	describe	ethical	and	emotional	paintings	and	sculptures.35	For	example,	in	Memorabilia	3,	10,		Xenophon	describes	a	conversation	between	Socrates	and	the	painter	Parrhasius,	in	which	they	discuss	whether	it	is	possible	to	depict	moral	characters	(ethê)	in	painting.	Socrates	convinces	Parrhasius	that	is	possible	to	paint	eyes	and	gazes	so	as	to	represent	attitudes	like	malevolence	and	benevolence.	Similarly,	painted	faces,	motions,	and	 states	 can	 represent	 character	 traits	 like	 prudence	 (to	 phronimon)	 or	 insolence	 (to	
hybristikon).	In	the	subsequent	interaction	between	Socrates	and	a	sculptor,	Cleiton,	Socrates	persuades	his	interlocutor	that	it	is	possible	to	represent	emotional	states	in	sculpture.	For	example,	this	may	be	achieved	by	imitating	the	threatening	eyes	of	a	fighter	or	the	triumphant	look	of	the	victor.	One’s	face,	eyes	and	posture	can	indicate	one’s	emotions	and	character,	which	is	why	emotions	and	character	can	be	represented	in	sculpture	and	painting.	This	view	finds	 an	 echo	 in	 the	 pseudo	 Aristotelian	 Phgn.	 812a12-b12,	 where	 a	 pale	 yellowish	complexion	and	white	eyes	indicate	fear	and	cowardice,	while	bravery	and	aggression	are	signalled	by	bright	(charypos)	eyes.	Similar	accounts	of	the	depiction	of	emotions	and	character	can	be	found	in	later	sources.	In	the	Zeuxis,	Lucian	appreciates	how	Zeuxis	communicates	the	father	centaur’s	brutishness	and	savageness	even	if	he	depicts	him	as	laughing	(Zeuxis	5-6).	Aelian,	about	a	century	later,	describes	a	painting	by	Theon	which	depicts	a	soldier	with	a	fierce	(gorgon)	look	in	his	eyes.	The	soldier	is	said	to	appear	bloodthirsty	and	ready	to	kill,	his	posture	showing	that	he	has	no	intention	to	spare	anyone	(Varia	historia	2,	44).36	If	paintings	can	represent	character	and	emotion	in	this	way,	it	is	plausible	to	think	that	they	can	also	generate	emotions	within	their	viewers.	While	these	sources	do	not	tell	us	much																																																									
34	This	expression	translates	ἐπίσημα	ἐν	τοῖς	πάθεσιν,	taking	the	episêma	to	be	distinguishing	marks	for	the	emotions.	Another	option	is	the	emendation	καὶ	ταῦτ’ἐστὶν	ἐπὶ	τοῦ	σώματος	ἐν	τοῖς	πάθεσιν,	see	e.g.	REEVE	(2017)	who	takes	the	passage	to	mean	that	colours	and	shapes	are	signs	of	a	body	affected	by	emotions.	35	This	analysis	is	indebted	to	GONZÁLEZ	(2019).	36	 For	 emotions	 depicted	 in	war	 and	battle	 themed	paintings,	 see	also	 PLUT.	De	 glor.	 Ath.	 346e-347a.	 Both	passages	are	described	in	SHEPPARD	(2015).	
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about	 the	 emotional	 reactions	 of	 the	 spectators,	 we	 can	 speculate	 that	 these	 expressive	paintings	might	have	been	affective	if	aided	by	the	contextual	assumptions	or	background	of	the	viewer.	Lucian	seems	able	to	appreciate	The	Centaur	Family	and	its	depiction	of	a	savage	centaur	because	he	has	some	background	knowledge	of	the	contrasts	between	centaurs	and	humans.	This	background	would	allow	him	to	feel	fear	or	awe	in	contemplating	the	centaur.	Aelian	tells	us	that	when	Theon’s	soldier	was	first	unveiled,	Theon	arranged	for	a	trumpeter	to	play	the	call	to	attack.	It	is	hard	to	see	how	the	sound	might	have	fooled	the	audience	into	thinking	that	the	soldier	was	real,	given	that	the	picture	is	static.	Presumably,	the	terrifying	sound	was	meant	to	enhance	the	terrifying	effect	of	the	painting	by	evoking	the	context	of	an	upcoming	battle.	This	analysis	of	how	paintings	can	contain	signs	of	character	and	emotions,	if	it	is	right,	suggests	that	paintings	can	also	make	their	viewers	feel	emotional.	However,	they	do	so	by	relying	on	either	background	assumptions	or	on	the	 interpretive	effort	of	 the	viewer.	The	viewer	has	to	contextualise	the	painting	of	the	soldier	with	an	approaching	violent	battle	to	be	affected	by	it.	Similarly,	the	viewer	must	have	some	knowledge	of	the	nature	of	centaurs	to	be	affected	by	 their	 frightening	depiction.	 In	virtue	of	 this	background	knowledge,	 the	vividness	of	a	painting	can	be	very	effective	in	moving	its	spectators.37	In	this	view,	paintings	and	sculptures	differ	in	their	affective	powers	from	other	art	forms,	like	music	and	tragic	poetry,	which	can	affect	us	even	if	we	lack	any	interpretive	background,	assumptions,	or	knowledge.	Music	in	particular,	for	Aristotle,	is	immediately	affective,	even	when	it	is	not	accompanied	by	words	(Pol.	1340a40-b15;	1340a10-15,	see	Ford	[2004]	on	this	difficult	passage).	Tragic	poetry,	in	turn,	can	give	rise	to	pity	and	fear	without	requiring	interpretive	effort	from	the	spectator.38	A	tragedy	can	move	us	because	of	the	spectacle,	but,	according	to	Aristotle,	the	best	way	for	it	to	give	rise	to	pity	and	fear	is	by	virtue	of	its	complex	plot.	The	plot	on	its	own	is	sufficient	to	move	us,	proven	by	the	fact	that	merely	reading	a	tragedy	can	make	us	feel	pity	and	fear	(Poet.	1450b18-19;	1453b1-7).	The	way	in	which	the	
																																																								
37	This	point	brings	to	mind	later	accounts	of	how	an	interpretive	activity	(intellegere)	brings	out	the	emotional	impact	of	a	picture,	see	e.g.	PLIN.	NH	35,	98	and	KEULS	(1978)	103-105.	38	I	do	not	mean	to	suggest,	here,	that	interpretation	is	not	necessary	for	the	cathartic	powers	of	tragedy.	Rather,	interpretation	is	not	necessary	for	the	mere	arousal	of	emotions.	I	thank	Tom	Mackenzie	and	Maria	Michela	Sassi	for	pushing	me	to	clarify	this	point.	
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plot	 secures	 these	effects	 is	multiform:	 it	has	to	be	plausible	 (Poet.	 1452a12-13);	 it	must	represent	the	right	kind	of	change	of	fortunes	(Poet.	1452b33-1453a10);	it	can	enhance	its	emotional	 impact	 in	 virtue	 of	 the	 correct	 effects,	 including	 the	 discovery	 of	 a	 character’s	identity	that	leads	to	a	reversal	of	his	or	her	sorts	(Poet.	1452a22-b9).	Thus,	the	affective	powers	of	pictures	and	sculptures	are	not	as	immediate	as	other	art	forms.	In	light	of	this	suggestion,	we	can	make	sense	of	Aristotle’s	remark	in	De	anima,	which	served	as	our	starting	point:	when	we	believe	that	something	is	terrible	or	frightful,	we	are	immediately	affected	(euthys	sumpaschomen),	but	the	same	does	not	happen	when	we	have	a	phantasia	or	when	we	look	at	something	terrible	or	audacious	in	a	picture	(De	an.	427b15-24).	In	this	passage,	Aristotle	is	not	necessarily	claiming	that	we	are	not	affected	by	pictures	or	 phantasiai.	 He	 writes	 more	 specifically	 that	 phantasia	 and	 pictures	 do	 not	 affect	 us	immediately	(euthys).	The	adverb	euthys,	in	this	context,	does	not	have	to	indicate	temporal	or	spatial	proximity.	Instead,	it	can	indicate	the	absence	of	other	intervening	causes.39	These	intervening	causes	that	enable	pictures	to	affect	us—according	to	the	admittedly	speculative	explanation	I	proposed—go	beyond	deception	and	include	the	viewer’s	interpretive	activity	and	her	background	knowledge.	In	addition,	they	include	the	association	between	what	the	pictures	represent	and	other	things	the	viewer	might	find	scary	or	moving	(Poet.	1455a1-4).		The	interpretation	can	also	be	supported	by	the	analogy	between	pictures	and	phantasia.	A	 phantasia,	 like	 a	 picture,	 can	 be	 affective	 even	 when	 it	 is	 not	 endorsed.	 However,	 its	affective	powers	are	often	mediated	by	a	more	complete	range	of	mental	activities	or	states.	In	the	Rhetoric,	we	find	a	number	of	cases	in	which	phantasia	gives	rise	to	emotions	when	accompanied	by	other	mental	states,	like	hopes,	beliefs,	or	desires.	Take,	for	example,	fear,	defined	as	“a	pain	or	disturbance	arising	from	the	phantasia	of	a	destructive	or	painful	future	evil”	(Rh.	1382a21-22).	The	phantasia	of	a	future	evil	that	gives	rise	to	fear,	Aristotle	explains,	is	accompanied	by	other	phantasiai:	the	evil	must	appear	close	(Rh.	1382a25).	Furthermore,	the	 people	 who	 feel	 fear	 must	 be	 in	 a	 certain	 condition	 (diakeimenoi),	 which	 Aristotle																																																									
39	See	BONITZ	(1870)	296	on	this	use	of	euthys,	which	occurs	also	at	Eth.	Nic.	1140b17;	Ph.	235b3;	Ph.	248b19.	My	view	is	similar	to	the	one	defended	by	MCCREADY-FLORA	(2013)	20-25,	who	takes	the	euthys	to	indicate	a	
ceteris	 paribus	 generalization	 and	 concludes	 that	 beliefs	 are	 generally	 or	 for	 the	most	 part	 affective,	while	
phantasiai	are	not.	In	my	interpretation,	phantasia	is	affective	through	the	mediation	of	an	intervening	cause,	belief	is	affective	without.	However,	unlike	McCready-Flora,	I	do	not	think	that	this	consideration	allows	us	to	generalise	that	phantasia	fails	to	affect	us	in	most	circumstances	or	in	normal	circumstances.	
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describes	from	Rh.	1382b26	onwards.	This	condition	may	include	different	sets	of	memories	and	experiences:	for	example,	people	who	are	affected	by	a	phantasia	of	an	incumbent	evil	are	those	who	have	not	been	very	fortunate,	for	fortunate	people	tend	to	think	no	evil	is	likely	to	happen	to	them.	Thus,	they	tend	not	to	feel	fear	(Rh.	1382b25-1383a13).	Similarly,	confidence	(tharsos),	which	is	the	opposite	of	fear,	is	“so	that	hope	of	safety	is	accompanied	by	the	phantasia	of	it	as	being	close,	while	frightening	things	are	absent	or	far	off”	(Rh.	1383a16-19).	In	this	case	too,	Aristotle	goes	on	to	describe	the	condition	of	confident	individuals	as	typical	of	those	who	have	overcome	many	dangers	or	no	dangers	at	all,	for	both	inexperience	and	experience	can	help	us	to	be	fearless	in	the	face	of	dangers.	Another	 case	 to	 consider	 is	 pity,	 “a	 pain	 taken	 in	 an	 apparent	 (phainomenôi)	 evil,	destructive	or	painful,	befalling	one	who	does	not	deserve	 it,	which	one	might	anticipate	oneself	or	someone	close	to	one	suffering,	and	this	whenever	it	appears	(phainêtai)	near”	(Rh.	1385b13-16).	However,	not	everyone	is	in	the	condition	to	be	affected	by	these	appearances	or	phantasmata	of	evils	befalling	on	those	who	do	not	deserve	it.	For	example,	insolent	people	or	people	prone	to	panic	do	not	feel	pity	because	they	are	too	focused	on	themselves	to	care	about	the	others	(Rh.	1385b30-1386a4).	The	cases	of	fear,	confidence	and	pity	are	not	isolated.	In	the	Rhetoric,	Aristotle	does	not	only	 describe	 the	 appearances	 that	 give	 rise	 to	 our	 emotions,	 but	 also	 the	 background	conditions,	 such	 as	 other	 mental	 states,	 typical	 of	 those	 who	 are	 prone	 to	 feeling	 these	emotions.	This	suggests	that,	although	phantasia	can	be	affective	when	it	is	not	endorsed,	its	affective	 powers	 are	 often	 mediated	 by	 one’s	 wider	 psychological	 condition.	 Some	interpreters	take	these	mediating	conditions	to	suggest	that	Aristotle	is	not	using	phantasia	as	a	technical	term	for	appearance	in	the	Rhetoric,	but	as	an	equivalent	of	belief.40	However,	this	interpretation	clashes	with	Aristotle’s	own	discussion	of	phantasia	as	the	kind	of	mental	phenomenon	that	we	experience	in	dreams	and	that	is	closely	related	to	perception	in	Rh.	1378b1-10	and	Rh.	1370a28-35.41	
																																																								
40	See	DOW	(2009),	who	defends	a	different	view	in	his	DOW	(2014).	41	See	MOSS	(2012)	78.	My	view,	here,	differs	from	Moss’	and	from	DOW	(2014)	in	that	I	take	the	further	mental	states	that	give	rise	to	the	emotions	not	to	be	endorsements	of	the	affective	phantasmata,	but	accompanying	background	conditions	like	general	dispositions,	further	phantasmata	or	beliefs.	
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The	 suggestion	 that	phantasia	 does	 not	 cause	 fully	 fledged	 emotions	 immediately,	 but	when	it	is	mediated	by	other	psychological	states	can	also	find	support	in	the	Nicomachean	
Ethics.	 In	Eth.	Nic.	7,	6,	Aristotle	argues	that	akrasia	with	respect	 to	spirit	 (thymos)	 is	 less	shameful	than	akrasia	with	respect	to	appetite	(epithymia).	Our	behaviour	is	less	shameful	when	we	act	against	our	decision	to	restrain	our	anger	than	when	we	reach	out	for	a	third	piece	of	cake	having	decided	that	two	were	enough.	This	is	because	spirit	follows	reason,	in	a	way,	while	our	appetite	does	not.	Spirit	is	like	a	servant	who	does	not	hear	the	instruction	of	the	master	in	full,	or	like	a	dog	who	barks	at	the	person	at	the	door	without	having	checked	whether	or	not	it	is	a	friend:	“In	 the	 same	 way,	 since	 spirit	 is	 naturally	 hot	 and	 hasty,	 it	 hears,	 but	 does	 not	 hear	 the	instruction,	and	rushes	off	to	exact	a	penalty.	For	reason	or	phantasia	has	shown	that	we	are	being	slighted	or	wantonly	insulted;	and	spirit,	as	though	it	had	inferred	that	it	is	right	to	fight	this	sort	of	thing,	is	irritated	at	once.	Appetite,	however,	only	needs	reason	or	perception	to	say	that	this	is	pleasant,	and	it	rushes	off	for	gratification.”42		Spirit,	in	this	passage,	seems	to	be	closer	to	an	emotional	reaction	like	anger	than	to	a	mere	desire.	If	this	is	right,	unlike	an	appetitive	desire,	an	emotion	like	anger	can	arise	on	the	basis	of	a	mere	appearance	or	isolated	thought,	but	it	needs	further	mediation	in	order	to	flourish	as	 a	 fully-fledged	 emotion.	 Aristotle	 argues	 here	 that	 spirit	 engages	 in	 a	 quasi-inference	(hôsper	syllogisamenos),	which,	in	addition	to	the	initial	thought	or	phantasia,	supports	it	in	boiling	up.43	When	spirit	has	mediated	the	initial	input	of	reason	or	phantasia,	it	is	irritated	at	once	(euthys).	In	this	context,	the	adverb	euthys	does	not	indicate	the	absence	of	mediation,	but	temporal	vicinity.	This	passage	therefore	suggests	that	phantasia,	and	sometimes	even	reason,	tends	not	to	cause	complex	emotions	in	isolation.	It	causes	emotions	as	a	part	of	a	more	complex	psychological	condition	that	can	involve	reasoning	or	quasi-reasoning.	At	this	point,	one	might	be	persuaded	that	phantasia	is	not	immediately	affective	because	it	 often	 requires	 other	 background	 conditions	 in	 order	 to	 generate	 an	 emotion,	 such	 as	further	 appearances,	 beliefs,	 or	 dispositions.	However,	 one	might	wonder	why	 phantasia																																																									
42	οὕτως	ὁ	θυμὸς	διὰ	θερμότητα	καὶ	ταχυτῆτα	τῆς	φύσεως	ἀκούσας	μέν,	οὐκ	ἐπίταγμα	δ'	ἀκούσας,	ὁρμᾷ	πρὸς	τὴν	τιμωρίαν.	ὁ	μὲν	γὰρ	λόγος	ἢ	ἡ	φαντασία	ὅτι	ὕβρις	ἢ	ὀλιγωρία	ἐδήλωσεν,	ὃ	δ'	ὥσπερ	συλλογισάμενος	ὅτι	δεῖ	τῷ	τοιούτῳ	πολεμεῖν	χαλεπαίνει	δὴ	εὐθύς·	ἡ	δ'	ἐπιθυμία,	ἐὰν	μόνον	εἴπῃ	ὅτι	ἡδὺ	ὁ	λόγος	ἢ	ἡ	αἴσθησις,	ὁρμᾷ	πρὸς	τὴν	ἀπόλαυσιν.	Eth.	Nic.	1149a30-b1.	43	 The	 nature	 of	 this	 quasi-reasoning	 is	 debated,	 see	PEARSON	 (2011).	What	matters	 for	my	purposes	 here,	however,	is	just	that	here	something	more	than	an	isolated	phantasia	is	needed	for	one’s	anger	to	boil	up.	
	 22	
differs	from	belief	in	this	respect.	It	is	conceivable	that	a	belief	that	something	is	scary	could	fail	to	affect	us,	given	other	background	conditions.	These	include	our	former	experiences	and	memories	about	dangerous	events	or	other	emotions	 that	we	might	be	 feeling	at	 the	same	 time.	 Aristotle	 does	 not	 necessarily	 overlook	 these	 conditions	 in	his	 account	of	 the	affective	 powers	 of	 belief.	 Rather,	 some	 passages	 in	 the	 ethical	 works	 suggest	 that	intervening	 conditions	 can	 prevent	 beliefs	 from	 affecting	 us.	 The	 brave	 person,	 on	 some	interpretations	at	least,	does	not	feel	fear	in	the	face	of	death,	even	though	presumably	they	believe	that	they	are	facing	a	dangerous	task.44	If	this	is	right,	in	Aristotle’s	view,	belief	and	
phantasia	 seem	 to	be	 specular	opposites	with	respect	 to	 the	 immediacy	of	 their	 affective	powers.	Mediating	causes	enable	phantasia	to	be	affective,	but	they	prevent	belief	from	being	affective.	We	are	now	 in	 the	position	 to	 take	 stock	on	Aristotle’s	view	of	 the	affective	powers	of	colours	and	pictures.	Like	 colours,	pictures	 can	be	affective	 in	 themselves	or	 incidentally.	Pictures	affect	us	because	of	their	colouration	and	execution,	because	of	their	mimetic	nature	and	 because	 they	 lead	 us	 to	 recall	 moving	 memories.	 Nonetheless,	 for	 Aristotle,	 the	representational	content	of	pictures	does	not	affect	us	immediately.	In	order	to	give	rise	to	an	emotion	as	mimetic	objects,	pictures	require	some	mediation.	We	are	affected	by	them	when	we	interpret	them,	when	they	deceive	us,	or	when	we	associate	them	with	something	we	find	moving.	This	lack	of	immediacy	in	the	affective	powers	of	pictures	as	mimetic	objects	makes	them	a	suitable	term	of	comparison	with	phantasiai.		
5.	Conclusion	In	Aristotle’s	works	on	psychology,	rhetorical	persuasion,	biology	and	aesthetics,	we	find	a	complex	and,	at	times,	incomplete	map	of	the	affective	powers	of	colours	and	pictures.	My	interpretation	of	these	texts	above	allows	us	to	fill	in	some	lingering	gaps	in	the	map	to	form	a	coherent	account.	According	to	Aristotle,	colours	can	give	rise	to	pleasure	and	pain	either	in	 themselves	 or	 incidentally.	 In	 addition,	 colours	 can	 give	 rise	 to	 emotions	 like	 fear	incidentally.	Pictures,	similarly,	can	affect	us	incidentally	or	in	themselves.	In	the	first	case,	
																																																								
44	Eth.	Nic.	1115a53-b4,	see	also	MCCREADY-FLORA	(2013).	
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they	affect	us	because	they	remind	us	of	things	we	find	scary	or	moving	or	in	virtue	of	their	representational	content.	In	the	second	case,	pictures	affect	us	because	of	their	colours	and	execution.	These	distinctions	help	us	to	make	sense	of	Aristotle’s	remark	that	pictures	do	not	affect	 us	 immediately	 at	 De	 an.	 427b15-24.	 In	 this	 passage,	 Aristotle	 is	 not	 necessarily	contradicting	his	account	of	the	affective	powers	of	colours,	because	he	might	be	concerned	with	the	affective	powers	of	pictures	as	mimetic	objects.	His	considered	view	may	thus	be	that	pictures	affect	us	as	mimetic	objects	through	the	mediation	of	interpretation,	deception,	or	 association.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 sense,	 therefore,	 that	 pictures	 are	 similar	 to	 phantasiai.	 An	appearance	 of	 a	 scary	 prospect	 does	 not	 affect	 us	 on	 its	own,	however	 vivid	 it	might	 be.	Rather,	it	affects	us	through	the	mediation	of	other	mental	states	and	dispositions.45	This	difference	in	emotional	immediacy	between	pictures	as	mimetic	objects	and	colours	is	the	result	of	the	attempt	to	fill	in	some	gaps	in	Aristotle’s	analysis	of	colours	and	pictures.	It	may	be	seen	as	a	reflection	of	his	careful	analysis	of	the	links	between	perception,	the	arts,	and	the	emotions.	Aristotle	thought	that	colour	perception	can	be	immediately	affective,	just	as	non-representational	arts	like	music	can	move	us	without	an	intervening	cause.	Pictures,	however,	 raise	 a	 whole	 new	 set	 of	 problems	 when	 we	 consider	 their	 representational	content.	In	order	to	address	these	problems,	one	might	speculate	that	pictures	move	us	in	virtue	of	what	they	represent	only	when	we	interpret	them,	when	we	are	deceived	by	them,	or	when	we	associate	them	with	something	else.	In	a	way,	pictures	require	this	further	effort	on	 our	 part	 because	 they	 are,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 too	 complex	 and	 too	 simple	 to	 affect	 us	immediately	as	music	and	colour	perception	do.	While	their	representational	nature	adds	to	their	 complexity,	unlike	 tragedies,	pictures	are	not	 representationally	 complex	enough	 to	affect	us	without	the	aid	of	context	and	interpretation.46																																																										
45	The	affective	powers	of	phantasia	might	be	different	in	the	case	of	non-human	animals	that	lack	reason	and	belief.	Since	non-human	animal	emotions	are	based	on	either	perception	or	phantasia,	it	is	plausible	to	think	that	phantasia	in	this	case	does	not	require	mediation	because	it	is	the	primary	source	of	affections.	The	same	view	can	be	defended	if	one	grants	that	phantasia	requires	assent	in	order	to	be	affective.	Non-human	animals	might	be	thought	of	as	assenting	to	phantasia	by	default,	if	one	thinks	that	they	are	capable	of	giving	a	non-rational	kind	of	assent	to	their	impressions	see	e.g.	MCCREADY-FLORA	(2013).	I	thank	Paolo	Natali	for	pushing	me	to	clarify	this	point.	46	I	am	immensely	grateful	to	Fiachra	Mac	Góráin,	Tom	Mackenzie	and	the	participants	to	the	Entretiens	for	their	very	helpful	and	insightful	comments	on	an	earlier	draft.			
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DISCUSSION		
A.	Grand-Clément:	Dans	votre	communication,	les	principales	émotions	liées	aux	couleurs	qui	ressortent	sont	le	plaisir	(que	l’on	a	déjà	rencontré	avec	Maria	Michela	Sassi)	mais	aussi	la	 peur.	 Existe-il	 des	 exemples	 précis	 de	 couleurs	 particulièrement	 effrayantes?	 Aristote	mentionne-t-il	l’or	parmi	les	couleurs	suscitant	du	plaisir?		
E.	 Cagnoli	 Fiecconi:	 Aristotle	 does	 not	 mention	 specific	 colours	 that	 one	 might	 find	fearsome	or	terrible,	even	though	he	does	mention	colours	that	are	pleasant	in	themselves,	like	 τὸ	 ἁλουργὸν	 καὶ	 τὸ	φοινικοῦν,	 at	 Sens.	 440a1.	 Perhaps	 the	 reason	why	 he	 does	 not	mention	specific	colours	is	because,	as	the	discussion	made	me	realise,	he	does	not	think	that	colours	give	rise	to	emotions	like	fear	or	anger	in	themselves,	but	incidentally,	i.e.	because	we	associate	them	with	other	fearful	things.	In	this	respect,	thus,	there	is	a	difference	with	intrinsically	pleasant	colours	like	crimson	or	purple	and	colours	an	animal	(human	or	non-human)	may	come	to	fear	as	a	result	of	a	painful	experience	linked	to	it.		
D.B.	Wharton:	 In	your	 chapter	you	discussed	different	 situations	 in	which	 colors	might	excite	 emotions	 according	 to	Aristotle,	 including	 for,	 example,	 paintings	 by	 artists	whose	work	Aristotle	either	recommends	or	condemns	as	being	appropriate	or	inappropriate	for	youth	to	view.	In	such	situations,	what	uses	of	color	do	imagine	Aristotle	might	have	had	in	mind	 that	 would	 excite	 either	 appropriate	 or	 inappropriate	 emotional	 reactions	 in	 the	painting’s	viewers,	and	what	might	those	emotions	be?		
K.	 Ierodiakonou:	 How	 do	 you	 understand	 exactly	 the	 characterisation	 of	 a	 painter	 as		 ἠθικός?		
E.	Cagnoli	Fiecconi:	For	ease	of	exposition,	 I	grouped	these	questions	together.	At	Poet.	1448a5	and	at	Pol.	1340a23-39,	Aristotle	contrasts	the	works	of	Polygnotus	to	the	works	of	Pauson.	In	the	Poetics,	he	argues	that	Polygnotus	depicted	superior	(beltiones)	people	and	Pauson	inferior	(cheirones)	people,	while	in	the	Politics	he	suggests	that	the	young	should	be	
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exposed	to	the	works	of	Polygnotus.	It	is	hard	to	reconstruct	whether	Aristotle	had	in	mind	a	specific	use	of	colour	or	a	specific	 technique	 in	recommending	the	works	of	Polygnotus.	However,	one	may	speculate	that	Polygnotus	is	more	appropriate	for	young	people	in	so	far	as	he	depicts	good	moral	characters.	This	might	be	the	point	 in	calling	him	ἠθικός	at	Pol.	1340a35-39.	If	this	is	right,	the	characterization	of	a	painter	as	ἠθικός	refers	to	the	fact	that	the	 painter	 in	 question	 not	 only	 represents	 characters,	 but	 more	 specifically	 represents	morally	good	or	virtuous	characters.		
K.	 Ierodiakonou:	 According	 to	 your	 interpretation	 of	 Aristotle’s	 passages,	 colours	 and	sounds	are	immediately	affective,	whereas	the	colours	and	sounds	of	artistic	works	are	less	affective.	Does	Aristotle	follow	the	Platonic	tradition	on	this,	thus	devaluing	the	importance	of	art?		
E.	Cagnoli	Fiecconi:	While	I	argue	that	for	Aristotle	painting	is	not	immediately	affective	in	so	far	as	it	is	mimetic,	I	do	not	mean	to	imply	that	it	is	less	affective	(in	the	sense	that	it	gives	rise	emotional	reactions	which	are	less	intense).	I	also	do	not	mean	to	imply	that	music	is	less	affective	when	it	is	accompanied	by	words.	In	fact,	I	think	that	music	can	also	be	immediately	affective	when	accompanied	by	words.	In	a	sense,	the	case	of	pictures	is	special;	the	limit	on	their	affective	powers	is	a	result	of	the	fact	that	they	are	both	mimetic	(unlike	simple	colours	and	 sounds)	 and	 static	 (unlike	music	with	 or	without	words	 and	 tragedy).	 The	 question	concerning	Aristotle’s	relationship	with	the	Platonic	tradition	is	very	interesting	and	also	too	large	 to	 be	 answered	 satisfactorily	 in	 a	 few	 lines.	 I	 do	 not	 think	 Aristotle	 devalues	 the	importance	of	art,	in	fact	unlike	Plato	in	the	Republic	10	he	seems	to	think	that	art	even	in	its	current	form	may	be	suitable	for	moral	education.	Perhaps	art	cannot	take	us	all	the	way	to	virtue,	but	it	can	be	a	starting	point	in	Pol.	8.	In	addition,	for	Aristotle	art	is	suitable	for	other	purposes,	like	recreation.	Another	interesting	point	of	comparison	between	the	Aristotelian	tradition	and	 the	Platonic	 tradition	 concerns	 the	 role	of	painting.	 In	Republic	10,	 it	 is	not	obvious	that	the	greatest	charge	against	poetry,	i.e.	that	it	corrupts	even	the	best	of	us,	also	applies	 to	 painting.	 Aristotle,	 if	 I	 am	 right,	 also	 thinks	 that	 painting	 is	 less	 powerful	 that	poetry,	at	 least	 in	so	 far	as	 it	requires	mediation	 in	order	to	affect	us.	These	comparative	
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issues	require	of	course	a	more	careful	treatment	and	it	would	be	helpful	to	take	into	account	the	reception	of	these	ideas	in	later	thinkers.		
M.M.	Sassi:	Your	discussion	about	 the	different	way	 in	which	tragic	poetry	and	painting	elicit	emotions	in	the	spectators	meets	one	of	the	most	intriguing	problems	of	both	ancient	and	modern	theory	of	art	and	literature	(from	ut	pictura	poesis	to	Lessing,	and	beyond),	and	I	 like	 your	 subtle	 argument	 about	 it.	 However,	 it	 would	 not	 seem	 fair	 to	me	 to	 deny	 an	intellectual	involvement	and	some	interpretive	effort	in	the	emotional	experience	of	tragic	theatre.	Your	final	claim	that	“tragic	poetry	gives	rise	to	pity	and	fear	without	requiring	an	interpretive	effort	from	the	spectator”	sounds	to	me	too	strong	with	respect	to	the	hard	issue	of	the	concept	of	katharsis	in	Aristotle’s	Poetics.	I	would	like	just	remind	you,	in	most	general	terms,	that	Aristotle	in	the	Politics	presents	the	purification	induced	by	the	tragic	spectacle	as	 integral	 to	 the	education	of	 the	Athenian	citizen.	 In	 this	 connexion	 I	would	 like	you	 to	clarify	if	you	admit	that	in	following	the	imitation	of	ethê	through	the	mythos	the	spectator	learns	something	about	him/herself,	or,	in	other	words,	there	is	a	cognitive	component	in	causing	tragic	emotions.		
E.	 Cagnoli	 Fiecconi:	 Tragic	 emotions	 have	 a	 cognitive	 component,	 but	 this	 cognitive	component	does	not	always	require	an	interpretive	effort.	We	pity	Oedipus	even	if	we	are	unable	to	introduce	further	external	interpretive	points	and	even	if	we	do	not	know	the	myth.	This	happens	because	the	tragedy’s	plot	gives	us	enough	information	about	the	unhappy	fate	of	Oedipus	to	generate	emotions.	By	this	I	do	not	mean	to	deny	that	interpretation	enhances	or	supports	tragic	emotions.	I	 just	mean	to	say	that	interpretation	is	not	necessary	to	give	rise	 to	 them.	 The	 topic	 of	katharsis	 is	 so	 complex	 that	 any	 treatment	 I	may	 offer	 here	 is	doomed	to	be	unsatisfactory	and	superficial.	Katharsis	may	indeed	require	interpretation	and	it	is	incorrect	to	imply,	as	I	may	have	done,	that	tragedy	does	not	require	interpretation	for	its	cathartic	function.	However,	even	if	katharsis	is	very	important	in	both	the	Poetics	and	the	
Politics,	it	is	not	a	precondition	of	the	pity	and	fear	that	tragic	poetry	instils,	but	it	seems	to	be	 a	 subsequent	 elaboration	 (or	purification,	depending	 on	 the	 correct	 interpretation)	 of	these	emotions.	So	perhaps	the	role	of	katharsis	need	not	be	taken	into	account	when	we	look	at	the	necessary	conditions	for	the	arousal	of	tragic	emotions.
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